Abstract. The verification of systems for protecting sensitive and confidential information is becoming an increasingly important issue. Differential privacy is a promising notion of privacy originated from the community of statistical databases, and now widely adopted in various models of computation. We consider a probabilistic process calculus as a specification formalism for concurrent systems, and we propose a framework for reasoning about the degree of differential privacy provided by such systems. In particular, we investigate the preservation of the degree of privacy under composition via the various operators. We illustrate our idea by proving an anonymity-preservation property for a variant of the Crowds protocol for which the standard analyses from the literature are inapplicable. Finally, we make some preliminary steps towards automatically computing the degree of privacy of a system in a compositional way.
Introduction
The most recent developments and usages of information technologies such as data profiling in databases, or user tracking in pervasive computing, pose serious threats to the confidential information of the users. For instance, the social networks Twitter and Flickr carefully protect their user's data by anonymization, and yet Narayanan and Smatikov [17] were able to conceive a de-anonymization algorithm which could reidentify 30% of the people who have accounts in both of them, with only a 12% error rate. The verification of systems for protecting sensitive and confidential information is becoming an increasingly important issue in the modern world.
Many protocols for protecting confidential information have been proposed in the literature. In order to obfuscate the link between the secret and the public information, several of them use randomized mechanisms. Typical examples are the DCNets [6], Crowds [19], Onion Routing [23] and Freenet [7] . Another common denominator is that various entities involved in the system to verify occur as concurrent processes and present typically a nondeterministic behavior. It is therefore natural and standard to apply process calculi, and the adaptation of the process-algebraic framework to specify and reason about security protocols is an active line of research. See e.g. the CCS approach [16, 9, 4] . In this paper, we consider a probabilistic extension of CCS, which we call CCS p . In addition to the standard parallel composition and nondeterministic choice of CCS, CCS p provides also a primitive for the probabilistic choice.
Several formalizations of the notion of protection have been proposed in the literature. Among those based on probability theory, there are strong anonymity and conditional anonymity [6, 13, 3] and probable innocence [19] . Different from the previous notions providing only true-or-false properties, the concepts from Information Theory [8] based on entropy, notably mutual information and capacity, express the degree of protection in a quantitative way.
Differential privacy [10, 12, 11 ] is a promising definition of confidentiality that has emerged recently from the field of statistical databases. It provides strong privacy guarantees, and requires fewer assumptions than the information-theoretical approach. We say that a system is -differentially private if for every pair of adjacent datasets (i.e. datasets which differ in the data of an individual only), the probabilities of obtaining a certain answer differ at most by a factor e . Differential privacy captures the intuitive requirement that the (public) answer to a query should not be affected too much by the (private) data of each singular individual. In this paper we consider a version of differential privacy using a generic notion of adjacency, which provides the basis for formalizing also other security concepts, like anonymity.
The main contribution of this work is to investigate differential privacy for concurrent systems in the context of a probabilistic process calculus (CCS p ). We present a modular approach for reasoning about differential privacy, where the modularity is with respect to the constructs of CCS p . More specifically, we show that the restriction operator, the probabilistic choice, the nondeterministic choice and a restricted form of parallel composition are safe under composition, in the sense that they do not decrease the privacy of a system. Compositionality plays an important role in the construction and analysis of security systems: Rather than analyzing a complex system as a whole, the safe constructs allow us to split the system in parts, analyze the degree of privacy of each part separately, and combine the results to obtain the global degree of privacy.
We illustrate our compositionality results by proving an anonymity-preservation property for an extension of the Crowds protocol [19] . Crowds is an anonymity protocol which allows Internet users to perform web transactions without revealing their private identity. This is achieved by using a chain of forwarders, chosen randomly, rather than sending the message directly to the final recipient. In the standard Crowds all members have the same probability of being used as forwarders, which gives the protocol a symmetric structure (cf. equations (13-14) in [5] ). In practice, however, the protocol can be asymmetric, because a sender may trust some agents (as forwarders) more than others, or may prefer those which are geographically closer, or more stable, in order to achieve a better performance. In this paper, our extension of Crowds consists in allowing each member to have a set of trusted users to which they can forward the message. This breaks the symmetry properties of the original protocol, thus making the standard analyses of [19] inapplicable. In contrast, our compositional method gives a simple proof.
Finally, we make some preliminary steps towards automatically computing the degree of privacy of a CCS p process in a compositional way. In this paper, we only
